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Abstract
The term deepfake was first used in a Reddit post in 2017 to refer to videos manipulated using artificial intelligence tech-
niques and since then it is becoming easier to create such fake videos. A recent investigation by the cybersecurity com-
pany Deeptrace in September 2019 indicated that the number of what is known as fake videos had doubled in the last
nine months and that most were pornographic videos used as revenge to harm many women. The report also highlighted
the potential of this technology to be used in political campaigns such as in Gabon and Malaysia. In this sense, the phe-
nomenon of deepfake has become a concern for governments because it poses a short-term threat not only to politics,
but also for fraud or cyberbullying. The starting point of this research was Twitter’s announcement of a change in its pro-
tocols to fight fake news and deepfakes. We have used the Social Network Analysis technique, with visualization as a key
component, to analyze the conversation on Twitter about the deepfake phenomenon. NodeXL was used to identify main
actors and the network of connections between all these accounts. In addition, the semantic networks of the tweets were
analyzed to discover hidden patterns of meaning. The results show that half of the actors who function as bridges in the
interactions that shape the network are journalists and media, which is a sign of the concern that this sophisticated form
of manipulation generates in this collective.
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1. Introduction
The recent upsurge in artificial intelligence (AI), along
with image processing andmachine learning, havemade
deepfake production possible. A video scarcely a minute
long that featured Barack Obama spouting harsh criti-
cism against current US President, Donald Trump, went
viral in early April 2018 (Fagan, 2018). In fact, the pre-
vious US leader had said nothing, although it was his
image that appeared in the video. The person whomade
it was actor Jordan Peele. He sought to sound the alarm
on how dangerously easy it was to use new technologies
to manipulate and falsify someone’s identity. Deepfake
videos entail risks, and can potentially undermine truth,
confuse citizens and falsify reality. With the arrival of
social media, the spread of this sort of content seems to
be unstoppable. Potentially, it may worsen issues relat-
ed to disinformation and conspiracy theories (Hasan &
Salah, 2019). They could even be weaponized to unleash
national or international crises (Stover, 2018).
The firstly widely known examples of deepfakes
appeared in November 2017, when a Reddit user called
Deepfakes uploaded a series of videos with the faces
of famous actresses, including Gal Gadot and Scarlett
Johansson, over the faces of pornographic actresses
(Rense, 2018). Since then, the media and the general
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public have begun using the term deepfakes to refer to
this sort of video made with AI, where one person’s face
can be confused with another’s.
When the computer code used to make the fakes
was shared, it sparked great interest in the Reddit
community and the amount of fake content spread
and increased. The fakes’ initial targets were celebri-
ties, including actors, singers and politicians. There are
two possible main reasons that they were successful:
accessibility and credibility (Kietzmann, Lee,McCarthy, &
Kietzmann, 2020), since we tend to trust more in voices
we know and in videos we see (Brucato, 2015).
2. State of Play
Manipulating photographs and videos, altering the real-
ity of the recorded moment, came before the Internet.
Different countries have carried out propaganda cam-
paigns since World War II (Rutenberg, 2017). However,
deepfakes account for a fundamental paradigm shift
in how the world will operate online (Chesney &
Citron, 2019).
Driven by the latest technological progress in AI and
machine learning, there is a growing number of tools that
make it possible for any unqualified individual to relative-
ly easily create fake content that is increasingly more dif-
ficult to detect. In 2018, the popular face-swap program
FakeApp required huge amounts of input data to create
fakes (Robertson, 2018). One year later, similar applica-
tions like Zao, Doublicat and DiffSnap were more accessi-
ble and less demanding (Mehta, 2020).
This technical resource is being widely used in action
films to replace actors with digital avatars in certain
dangerous scenes, or even to digitally resurrect actors
who have passed away (Atkin, 2019). However, when we
observe their use in information systems, there are a great
number of dangers and ethical challenges (Sora, 2018).
While there are those who mention the entertaining
and even positive side of fakes (Kietzmann et al., 2020),
some works address the use of deepfakes in online
disinformation campaigns to manipulate public opinion
(Riechmann, 2018). Many authors warn of the impor-
tant repercussions that failure to curb their spread may
pose, both to the population (Newman et al., 2015) and
to democracy (Bennett & Livingston, 2018; Chadwick,
Vaccari, & O’Loughlin, 2018; Rojecki & Meraz, 2016;
Waisbord, 2018). There are even those who state that
their fast andwidespread dissemination can lead to great
economic loss or national security risks (Yadlin-Segal &
Oppenheim, 2020). In parallel fashion, if deepfakes con-
tribute to increased uncertainty regarding the informa-
tion they contain, another one of the risks of their use is
reduced trust in the news media (Fletcher, 2018; Vaccari
& Chadwick, 2020). Credibility in the news is falling
around the world (Hanitzsch, Van Dalen, & Steindl, 2018)
and trust in social media news is now less than news
accessed through other channels (Newman, Fletcher,
Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018).
Given that there is a great deal at stake, auto-
matic detection of deepfakes is an important problem,
although difficult to undertake. Some argue that they
can be fought through legislation and regulations, com-
pany policies, education and training (Westerlund, 2019).
There are others who advocate for developing technol-
ogy to detect deepfakes and to authenticate content
and for prevention. In fact, many tools have been cre-
ated to automatically detect deepfakes. To date, meth-
ods to detect these digital manipulations were based
on intrinsic contradictions in the algorithm synthesis.
For example, a lack of actual eye blinking (Li, Chang, &
Lyu, 2018), or mismatching lip movement with speech
(Korshunov & Marcel, 2018). There are systems that
use a Convolutional Neural Network that extracts frame-
level features that are then used to train a Recurrent
Neural Network that learns to determine whether or not
a video has been manipulated (Güera & Delp, 2018; Li &
Lyu, 2018). There are even those who suggest tracking
and monitoring the source and history of content to the
origin, based on the principle that if it is reliable or presti-
gious, then the content can be real and authentic (Hasan
& Salah, 2019).
Deepfakes promise to be one of the greatest chal-
lenges for social media platforms in 2020. Some, like
Facebook and Adobe, raised policies to detect and fight
deepfakes. The latest was Twitter, which announced a
new policy in February to fight the impact of manipulat-
ed content (Robertson, 2020).Moreover, Google has also
decided to take action to limit their reach by creating an
algorithm to detect and automatically delete deepfakes
uploaded to YouTube and other Google services. It also
created a tool called Assemble that helps journalists to
identify manipulated images (Alba, 2020).
Although deepfakes have become a topic of debate,
academic research has only just recently begun address-
ing digital disinformation on social media (Anderson,
2018), which can be dangerous to the public sphere
given the potential to create states of false opinion
(Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 2018). In this regard, this
study contributes to this debate by analyzing the conver-
sation on Twitter about the deepfake phenomenon and
which type of actors are most referenced and made viral
by users, all after the news that Twitter was going to dou-
ble down in its efforts to fight fake news and videos.
3. Objectives
This study’s generic objective is to analyze the conversa-
tion and the structure of relationships on the net aris-
ing around the term deepfake on Twitter by means of
the social network analysis technique. Deepfakes is still
a relatively new and ‘fluid’ phenomenon in the making.
This article may help people understand how different
actors try to shape and ‘crystalize’ our understanding of
the emerging issue, as well as mapping the most impor-
tant actors in this debate. It contains the following spe-
cific objectives: 1) Identify the main actors and research
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which ones hold a greatest advantage when controlling
the spread of messages—all actors who posted mes-
sages containing the term deepfake or who were replied
to ormentioned in thosemessages have been examined;
and 2) analyze the semantic network arising around the
search term deepfake and discover which content pre-
dominates in messages.
4. Hypothesis
The following hypothesis are formulated:
H1: Politicians and the media are amongst the actors
who are most referenced and made viral by third par-
ties when speaking of deepfakes on Twitter (related
to the first objective).
Politicians, because they often become the involuntary
protagonists of videos which, with a humorous tone,
form part of disinformation campaigns that affect their
image and credibility. The news media, because they
are worried about the consequences that improper use
of this face-swapping technology may have for govern-
ments, companies and the general population.
H2: Themost relevant topicswhen users discuss deep-
fakes on Twitter (related to the second objective) are
related to politics and concern over the growing dif-
ficulty in distinguishing between reality and fiction in
the near future.
It is important to examine whether the content about
deepfakes also relates to politics because “political deep-
fakes are an important product of the Internet’s visual
turn. They are at the leading edge of online, video-based
disinformation and, if left unchallenged, could have pro-
found implications for journalism, citizen competence,
and the quality of democracy” (Vaccari & Chadwick,
2020, p. 2). In this sense, according to Maddocks (2020),
most of the deepfakes that are spread on the Internet
today are pornographic in nature, but public attention is
typically focused on political deepfakes. Often simulating
the image of high-profile politicians, these videos spread
hoaxes and lead to political instability.
5. Methodology
Using the Social Network Analysis technique (Borgatti,
Mehra, Brass, & Labianca, 2009; Freeman, 2004; Otte &
Rousseau, 2002; Wasserman & Faust, 1994), this article
studies the structure of networked relationships woven
around the term deepfake on the social media platform
Twitter. This platformwas selected because it is open and
creates a huge amount of interpersonal interactions that
can be collected by academic researchers to study pro-
cesses of how information is spread on social networks
(Benson, 2016; Boyd, 2014; Brubaker & Wilson, 2018;
Evans, 2016; Tolson, 2010).
To explore the properties of the net (relevance of
actors and information flows), open-source software
NodeXL Pro was used, one of the programs to study dig-
ital networks that is most used by the scientific com-
munity (Hansen, Shneiderman, & Smith, 2010; Ricaurte
& Ramos-Vidal, 2015; Smith et al., 2010). This tool
was used in different works of research, such as the
one analyzing connections between politicians and jour-
nalists in Holland (Verweij, 2012), the use of hash-
tags and trending topics (Dossis, Amanatidis, & Mylona,
2015; Wukich & Steinberg, 2013), news-spreading pro-
cesses (Ahmed & Lugovic, 2019), the spread of hoaxes
regarding the coronavirus (Pérez-Dasilva, Meso-Ayerdi,
& Mendiguren-Galdospín, 2020), and more.
The software captured a network of 15,885 actors
who posted messages containing the term deepfake
or who were replied to or mentioned in those mes-
sages. The sample was taken from a data set limited
to a maximum of 18,000 tweets (formal limits of the
NodeXL software sample universe). The database was
obtained through Twitter’s streaming API February 28th,
2020, at 09:41 UTC. The reason for this choice is that
on February 5th, the platform created by Jack Dorsey
announced a new policy to fight content manipulation
like fake news and fake videos (Robertson, 2020). The col-
lected tweets were posted between February 7, 2018, at
11:17 UTC and February 28, 2020, at 09:28 UTC. Users
were grouped by hierarchical conglomerates (or cluster
analysis; Kaleel & Abhari, 2015; Paolillo, 2008), using
the algorithm by Clauset, Newman, and Moore (2004).
To visualize the network, Harel and Koren’s (2000) multi-
scale design algorithm was used, which facilitates identi-
fication of actors and their links. Analysis was based on
directed and weighted edges. The weight reflected the
number of times that actors postedmessages containing
the term deepfake or who were replied to or mentioned
in those messages.
To analyze the role held by actors and the relation-
ships that occur between them on the network revolv-
ing around the term deepfake, two of the most common
centrality indicators in the SNA were used: in-degree
and the degree of betweenness. The in-degree is the
number of interactions an actor has received from oth-
er users forming the structure (Aguilar-Gallegos et al.,
2016; Fernández, 2019). Actors with the highest num-
bers were the most-referenced and made most-viral,
so their content is the most influential. On the other
hand, the degree of betweenness is the capacity to con-
trol spreading of a message (Gibbs & McKendrick, 2015;
Hansen et al., 2010). Users with the highest numbers act-
ed as bridges over which relevant information flowed,
and they contributed to spreading or blocking it for oth-
er parts of the network. The color and size of the nodes
show themost relevant accounts, and the strength of the
bonds between them was shown with the intensity of
the lines joining them.
To study the semantic network created around the
search term deepfake, words such as conjunctions and
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prepositions, which are not relevant, were eliminated.
Next, a data-mining strategy based on word-matching
was applied (on nouns, verbs, adverbs and adjectives) to
identify the strongest connections (Seo, Kim, Kim, Kim, &
Kim, 2019) and its presence in eachmessagewas studied
from a relational perspective. These data were interpret-
ed as non-directed graphs.
6. Results
Structure indicators or cohesion measurements, such as
density or reciprocity, that analyze the complete net-
work’s properties were 0.006393862 for the ratio of
reciprocal vertex pairs and 5.981029 for the average
geodesic distance. The first data indicates that 6 of every
100 users held mutual communication during the peri-
od of study, and the second that the actor was locat-
ed at almost six steps on average from any other in the
analyzed structure. Moreover, density or cohesion was
6.86199%. These data indicate that this is a dense net-
work,where nodes are not very far fromone another and
with a high speed of information transmission.
Centrality indicators, which show the position a node
or actor holds on the network, also bore interesting
results. Figure 1 shows the existence of different commu-
nities. Of note are eight large-sized clusters (light-blue,
orange, red, green, dark green, yellow, light green and
maroon), followed by ten moderately-sized groupings.
According to the nodes’ in-degree, of the first 20, a
group of 10 accounts from India stands out, followed by
eight profiles from the US or headquartered in the US
(such as Mashable or Elon Musk), plus another one from
Brazil and another from France (Figures 2 and 3). The one
with the highest value is @techreview, MIT’s magazine.
This actor’s contents are amongst the most-referenced
and most virally spread by third parties. One of the mes-
sages reports on the purchase by Fintech Square, head-
ed by Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey, of the AI research compa-
ny Dessa, a company known for its deepfake-detection
software. Its technology became known thanks to the
deepfake on Joe Rogan, a mixed martial arts commenta-
tor and one of the most popular podcasters in the world
on May 17, 2019 (Vincent, 2019).
Moreover, another post under the same profile is
of note, which went widely viral and reported on the
use of a deepfake to win voters, used by Indian politi-
cian Manoj Tiwari, president of the Bharatiya Janata par-
ty (BJP). According to MIT’s magazine, this was the first
time in the world that a political party used a deepfake
for an electoral campaign. The controversy arose when
Figure 1. Illustration of the network around the term deepfake.
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Figure 2. Illustration of the 20 actors most-referenced by users.
Tiwari manipulated one of his electoral videos with deep-
fake technology to simulate that he was speaking a Hindi
dialect, and thus reachmillions of voters that would have
been unreachable otherwise, since they only speak this
dialect. According to the party itself, they hired the com-
pany Ideaz Factory to create deepfakes to reach voters
in the 22 different languages and 1,600 dialects used
in India.
An examination of the content around the 20 most-
referenced actors detects three aspects. On the
one hand, the presence of politics when speaking
of deepfakes must be mentioned. Throughout the
period of study, ten of the actors most-referenced
by third parties are related to Manoj Tiwari (the
magazine @techreview, activist @GuaravPandhi,
@ManojTiwariMP, journalist @UmashankarSingh, TV
program @OnReality_Check, politician @amitmalviya,
film director @anuragkashyap72, the party @BJP4India,
journalist @NilChristopher and television channel
@ndtv). In addition to this group is US politician Joe
Biden, another node to which a huge number of users go
in an attempt to generate a direct link with him. Former
vice president Biden became a protagonist based on
a video related to the Democratic Primary debate of
2020. The original recording of the debate in Nevada
was edited by Mike Bloomberg, one of the participants,
to improve his image since he did not appear in a flat-
tering light. The billionaire modified the audio and order
of scenes in the video and included grasshopper sounds
when his adversaries responded. The video obtained
4,2 million views. Shortly thereafter, Twitter announced
that it would sanction the video for violating its new
media manipulation policy.
Another topic revolves around film. Six of the most
viralized actors are related to two manipulations of pop-
ular films using AI to swap the faces of movie stars
in one or several iconic scenes. One of the deepfakes,
with almost half a million views, fakes a moment from
the well-known science fiction series Star Trek. The
video was made by The Fakening, a famous YouTube
channel owned by programmer Paul Shales, devoted
to creating fake videos with AI. This face-swapping
technology places Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos in the
role of the series’ actors, and is associated with the
media profiles @verge, owner of Tesla @elonmusk,
owner of Amazon @JeffBezos and French influencer
@jblefevre60. The other manipulated film, the work of
YouTuber EZRyderX47 with almost nine million views,
is Back to the Future. Thanks to its quality, it is refer-
enced by commentator @PoohChaikonNun, entertain-
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Figure 3. In-degree: Actors most-referenced and viralized by other users.
ment website @Nerdbunker and another media out-
let @mashable.
Lastly, the third topic area has to do with the very
technology used to produce deepfakes. In this area,
five profiles are of note whose contents are amongst
the most-referenced and made most-viral by third par-
ties. As mentioned previously, one of them is @techre-
view, MIT’s magazine, reporting on Jack Dorsey’s pur-
chase of the deepfake software company Dessa. Another
is CNN journalist Donie O’Sullivan (@donie), author of
the highly viral news piece on the dangers associated
with improper use of this technology. This information
is also related to @NilChristopher, another one of the
actors with a high in-degree. Within this scope, we also
see French influencer @jblefevre60 holding one of the
top positions. He is mentioned in a very widespread
tweet by global influencer Spiros Margaris, explaining
how video faking technology works. The fifth actor is
@Youtube, since there are plenty of videos about the
dangers of deepfakes that end with the phrase “via
@Youtube” to indicate the platform from whence the
content was obtained.
Regarding the degree of betweenness (Figures 4
and 5), we observe that 13 of the actorsmentioned in the
section above appear again in the 20 top positions. They
have the highest values, which means that these nodes
are intermediaries through which relevant information
related to deepfakes is spread. These users are the ones
who contribute the most to spreading or blocking mes-
sages to other people that give shape to the structure.
In this regard, it is interesting to highlight that, of the
20 actors with the most favorable positions, there are
six media outlets (@techreview, @verge, @mashable,
@OnReality_Check, @CNN, @YouTube) and three jour-
nalists (@donie, @UmashankarSingh, @NilChristopher)
who act as bridges in interactions giving shape to the
network. In this regard, also in analyzing the role played
by certain actors in configuring the structure, we must
make special mention of @thefakening (15th position),
because this YouTube channel creates a good portion
of the most popular deepfakes spread amongst social
media. Barring exceptions,manyof his fake videos garner
no more than 25,000 views, but the fake with Elon Musk
and Jeff Bezos as actors on Star Trek reached almost half
a million views and became his most viral video.
Regarding semantic analysis of the network, themost
relevant conversation threads revolve around the video
of Indian politician Manoj Tiwari, highlighting that this
is the first time in the world that a political party used
deepfake technology to conduct an electoral campaign
(Figure 6). Moreover, it is rated as “dangerous and ille-
gal” (Pandhi, 2020). The second most-significant associ-
ation has to do with the deepfake of Star Trek, with the
owners of Amazon and Tesla. In third position, we find
references to the Back to the Future video.
7. Conclusions
This study shows the network woven around the term
deepfake after Twitter’s announcement that it was
tightening its protocols to fight fake news and videos.
The data indicate that this is a dense network with
high connectivity where information on deepfakes quick-
ly spreads. Although reports state that 96% of these
fakes are non-consensual pornography (Patrini, 2019),
this piece of research observes that in the microblogging
network, the most important topics are not related to
pornographic content. The nodes with the most favor-
able positions in the structure converse on fake videos
related to politicians (H1). This coincides with studies
such as those by Maddocks (2020) which explain that,
although most of the deepfakes that spread over the
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Figure 4. Illustration of the main actors control the flow of information on the network.
Figure 5. Betweenness degree: Actors who act as bridges in the interactions that shape the network.
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Figure 6. Illustration of the most relevant conversation topics regarding deepfakes.
Internet are pornographic in nature, public attention is
focused above all on political deepfakes because of their
ability to generate political instability. In contrast, oth-
er authors such as Westerlund (2019) conclude that the
reason many counterfeits focus on celebrities and politi-
cians is basically because they are public figures who
have a large number of free videos and photos on the
Internet and it is an easy way to train an AI deepfake sys-
tem. According to these two recent studies, this is only
the beginning. There are going to be more and more
deepfakes that use AI to spread fake political videos tai-
lored to the preferences of social media users.
Secondly, the nodes that have the greatest structural
advantage in the network also refer to satirical videos of
famous filmswhere face-swapping technology is used on
the actors in one or several iconic scenes from said films.
The result of this is that if we consider the net-
work according to the in-degree, the most-referenced
and viralized users are celebrities (politicians, business-
men or businesswomen, singers, athletes and more)
that see how they become the target of manipulations.
Thirdly, and in relation to the above two points, we also
observe concern, especially with news media, for the
consequences that improper use of this AI technology
may have for citizens, companies and governments (H2).
In all their tweets, analyzed in this study, news media
talk about the potential danger of this technology. This
research coincides with recent studies such as those
by Yadlin-Segal and Oppenheim (2020, p. 1) because it
“shows how journalists frame deepfakes as a destabiliz-
ing platform that undermines a shared sense of social
and political reality.” On the other hand, if we consid-
er the network in terms of degree of betweenness, we
observe that half the actors with the greatest capacity
to control the spread of messages on deepfakes are also
journalists or news media (H1). In this study, although
most of the videos are entertaining and easy to spot,
these professionals are clearly concerned and have the
responsibility of discrediting these fake videos and avoid-
ing the manipulation of public opinion: “Authentication
of video is especially important to news media com-
panies who have to determine authenticity of a video
spreading in a trustless environment, in which details of
the video’s creator, origin, and distribution may be hard
to trace” (Westerlund, 2019, p. 46)
In this work, attention has been focused on the con-
versation about deepfakes, about the way users talk
about the subject, and it has been shown who are the
most referenced actors and whose contents are the
most viralized by users. As mentioned above in the arti-
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cle, deepfakes is still a relatively new phenomenon and
the purpose of this manuscript has been to help under-
stand how different actors try to shape and crystalize
our understanding of the emerging issue, as well as map-
ping the most important actors in this debate. Current
research could be extended to include the study of the
spread of deepfakes. Work is continuing in this area in
order to overcome limitations connected to this study.
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